Applying Negishi’s method to stochastic models with overlapping generations by Brumm, Johannes & Kübler, Felix
 
 
 
    Working Paper  
         Series 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
National Centre of Competence in Research  
Financial Valuation and Risk Management 
 
 
Working Paper No. 851 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applying Negishi’s Method to Stochastic Models with 
Overlapping Generations 
 
 
 
Johannes Brumm          Felix Kuebler 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First version: March 2013 
Current version: March 2013 
 
This research has been carried out within the NCCR FINRISK project on  
“Computational Financial Economics” 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Applying Negishi’s method to stochastic
models with overlapping generations∗
Johannes Brumm
DBF, University of Zurich
johannes.brumm@googlemail.com
Felix Kubler
DBF, University of Zurich
and Swiss Finance Institute
kubler@isb.uzh.ch
March 21, 2013
Abstract
In this paper we develop a Negishi approach to characterize recursive equilibria in stochastic
models with overlapping generations. When competitive equilibria are Pareto-optimal, using
Negishi-weights as a co-state variable has three major computational advantages over the stan-
dard approach of using the natural state: First, the endogenous state space is a unit simplex and
thus easy to handle. Second, the number of unknown functions characterizing equilibrium dy-
namics is orders of magnitude smaller. Third, approximation errors have a compelling economic
interpretation.
Our main contribution is to show that the Negishi approach extends naturally to models
with borrowing-constraints and incomplete financial markets where the welfare theorems fail.
Many of the computational advantages carry over to this setting. We derive sufficient conditions
for the existence of Markov equilibria in the complete markets model as well as for models with
incomplete markets and borrowing constraints.
∗We thank participants of ICE 2012 and of ‘7e Journée d’Economie de l’Ensai’ and seminar participants at the
EUI and in particular Bernard Dumas, Piero Gottardi, Ken Judd, David Levine, Ramon Marimon and Herakles
Polemarchakis for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the ERC.
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1 Introduction
In stochastic infinite horizon exchange economies with overlapping generations and complete finan-
cial markets the welfare theorems hold if one assumes that there is a Lucas tree in unit net supply.
Thus, Negishi’s (1960) approach to characterize equilibrium allocations as the solution to a social
planner’s problem can be employed (see Kehoe et al. (1992)). Unfortunately, Negishi’s approach
is typically thought of as useful only when the number of commodities is larger than the number
of agents and in the OLG model both the number of agents and the number of commodities are
countably infinite. Moreover, in the presence of borrowing constraints or when financial markets
are incomplete, competitive equilibria fail to be Pareto-efficient and Negishi’s method appears no
longer to be applicable. In this paper we show that using Negishi’s method to compute equilibria in
OLG models can result in large efficiency gains compared to conventional methods that approximate
recursive equilibria on a natural state space, e.g. agents’ portfolios. We also show that Negishi’s
method can still be applied in the presence of borrowing constraints and incomplete markets. We
consider an OLG exchange economy with L perishable commodities and Markovian fundamentals.
Each period H agents enter the economy, they live for A periods and maximize time-separable ex-
pected utility. We start with a model with complete financial markets where equilibrium allocations
are Pareto-efficient and can be obtained as a solution to a planner’s problem that maximizes the
sum of all agents’ utility weighted by Pareto-weights that ensure budget-balance for each agent. At
each node of the tree we define instantaneous Negishi weights as the discounted weights associated
with agents currently alive. Since utility is time- and state-separable, individuals’ consumption at
each node is a simple function of the instantaneous Negishi-weights. As a second step we show
how the approach extends naturally to debt-constrained models with possibly incomplete financial
markets where the welfare theorems fail. We argue that it is still advantageous to use instantaneous
Negishi-weights as the endogenous state variable. Obviously, they can no longer be interpreted as
welfare weights for a social planner’s problem, but they are still a sufficient statistic for current
consumption.
Models with overlapping generations have widespread applications in public finance, macroeco-
nomics, and finance (see e.g. Kotlikoff and Auerbach (1983) or Storesletten et al. (2007)). In the
presence of aggregate risk the computation of equilibria in these models becomes very difficult (see
e.g. Krueger and Kubler (2004)). One of the difficulties stems from the fact that it is common to
use individuals’ cash-at-hand, i.e. the value of their beginning of period portfolio-holdings, as an
endogenous state variable and that in these models the domain of policy functions is endogenous
and possibly quite large. For models with infinitely lived agents, there have been various papers that
use instead individuals’ consumption or instantaneous Negishi-weights as a co-state to facilitate the
computation of equilibria (e.g. Cuoco and He (1994), Chien and Lustig (2011), Chien et al. (2011)
and Dumas and Lyasoff (2012)). We show that for models with overlapping generations, instanta-
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neous Negishi-weights do not only have the advantage that one can take a unit-simplex as the state
space. One also needs to approximate fewer functions to characterize the equilibrium dynamics of
the economy. For the case of complete markets, one needs only the map from the current state to
Negishi weights of the current young. These are SH functions, where S is the number of exogenous
shocks and H is the number of agents per generation. In contrast, one needs H(A− 1)S2 functions
if one wants to approximate the map from current cash-at-hand across agents to their cash-at-hand
next period for each combination of shocks in the current and the subsequent period. Furthermore,
the use of Negishi weights as states allows for a straightforward error analysis. Approximation
errors can be interpreted as transfers that are necessary to obtain the computed allocation as an
equilibrium allocation. Last but not least, using Negishi’s method the computational burden barely
increases with the number of physical commodities, while it substantially increases if the natural
state space is used.
It is well known that recursive equilibrium might not exist in stochastic models with overlap-
ping generations if one uses beginning of period asset holdings as the endogenous state variable (see
Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004)). Sufficient conditions for existence are generally not applicable
to models used in applications (see e.g. Citanna and Siconolfi (2010)). We examine existence of
equilibria for which the Negishi-weights follow a Markov-process. While we do not know of coun-
terexamples to existence in our framework, it seems likely that one can construct them. However,
we show for the case of 2 period lived agents that recursive equilibria always exist, even if there is
intra-generational heterogeneity and there are several goods (i.e. in the set-up of Kubler and Pole-
marchakis’ counterexample). It is known that in our unconstrained model with complete markets
equilibria are unique if all agents utility functions satisfy the gross-substitute property (see Kehoe
et al. (1991)). We show that even if agents’ are borrowing constrained, as long as they can trade in
a full set of Arrow-securities, the assumption still guarantees uniqueness and hence the existence of
a recursive equilibrium. In this paper we focus on pure exchange economies. The introduction of a
neo-classical production sector is straightforward – however our existence results that rely on a gross
substitute property do not carry over. Existence of recursive equilibria in production economies is
an open issue that is subject to further research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic model with
complete markets, characterize recursive equilibria and explain the computational advantages of our
approach. Although this is only a special case of our general model, it is useful to examine it first
as it makes the computational advantages most transparent. In Section 3 we introduce borrowing
constraints and incomplete markets and derive conditions for the existence of Markov equilibria in
this general setup. In Section 4 we discuss two special cases. First we assume that markets are
incomplete but that agents are not borrowing constraint. Then we examine the case where agents
can trade in a full set of Arrow securities but are borrowing constrained. For this latter case, we
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proof existence of recursive equilibria under a gross substitutes assumption. In Section 5 we give
an interpretation of the instantaneous Negishi-weights as welfare weights in a modified planner’s
problem.
2 Complete markets
To fix ideas we start with an economy with complete financial markets and no borrowing constraints.
We assume that there is a Lucas-tree in unit net supply – this guarantees Pareto-efficiency of
equilibrium allocations (see e.g. Demange (2002)). In the next section we generalize the model by
allowing for arbitrary financial securities and borrowing constraints.
2.1 The physical economy
Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Exogenous shocks st ∈ S = {1, . . . , S} follow a Markov chain. A
finite history of shocks σ = st = (s0, s1, . . . , st) is also called date-event or node of the event-tree.
We use the symbols σ and st interchangeably. To indicate that st
′
is a successor of st (or st itself)
we write st
′
 st. The set of all possible date-events st is denoted by Σ. We consider an exchange
economy with L perishable commodities available for consumption at each date-event.
At each date-event H agents enter the economy; they live for A periods. An individual is
identified by the date-event of his birth, σ = st, and his type, h ∈ H = {1, . . . , H}. The age of an
individual is denoted by a = 1, . . . , A; he consumes and has endowments at all nodes st+a−1  st,
a = 1, . . . , A. At a given date-event st we can uniquely identify agents who consume at that node by
their age and type, (a, h). We denote the set of all these agents by A = {(a, h) : 1 ≤ a ≤ A, h ∈ H}
and the set of all agents except for generation i by A−i = A \ {(a, h) : a = i, h ∈ H}. We will use
(a, h) and (st, h) interchangeably to refer to a specific agent.
We denote individual endowments by ωa,h(s
t) ∈ RL+ and assume that they are positive time-
invariant functions of the current shock alone. Each agent has an intertemporal time-separable
utility function,
Ust,h(x) = u1,h
(
x(st)
)
+
A−1∑
a=1
∑
st+ast
δa,h(s
t+a)ua+1,h
(
x(st+a)
)
,
where x(σ) ∈ RL+ denotes consumption of agent (s
t, h) at date-event σ, and x denotes consumption
over the lifecycle
{x(st+a)}0≤a≤A−1,st+ast .
The probability-discount factors δa,h(s
t) > 0 are assumed to be stationary in that δ1,h(s
t) = 1 and
δa,h(s
t+a) = δa−1,h(s
t+a−1)δa,h(st+a−1, st+a) for some δa,h(s, s
′) > 0. This formulation encompasses
heterogeneous beliefs as well as heterogeneous and age-varying discounting. The Bernoulli-functions
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ua,h : R
L
+ → R are assumed to be C
2 on RL++, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfy an
Inada condition: for all y ≫ 0 the closure of the set {x ∈ RL+ : u(x) > u(y)} lies in R
L
++.
There is a Lucas tree in unit net supply paying dividends d(st) ∈ RL+, d(s
t) > 0. Dividends
are a function of the shock alone, so d(st) = d(st) for some function d : S → R
L
+. At time t = 0,
in addition to the H new agents (s0, h), h ∈ H, there are individuals of each age a = 2, . . . , A
and each type h = 1, . . . , H present in the economy. We denote these individuals by (s1−a, h) for
h = 1, . . . , H and a = 2, . . . , A. They have initial tree holdings, θs
1−a,h(s−1), summing up to one:
A∑
a=2
θs1−a,h(s
−1) = 1.
These holdings determine the ‘initial condition’ of the economy. The aggregate endowment in the
economy is ω¯(st) = ω¯(st) = d(st) +
∑
(a,h)∈A ωa,h(st).
2.1.1 Complete financial markets
At each node there are complete spot markets for the L commodities. Prices are π(st) ∈ RL++ with
the normalisation that π1(s
t) = 1 for all st. Agents can trade the Lucas tree after dividends are
payed out. Let θst,h(s
t) ≥ 0 denote the Lucas tree holding of individual (st, h) at date-event st and
let q(st) denote the price of the tree at that node. In addition there are S Arrow securities available
for trade at each node. Arrow security s ∈ S pays one unit of the numéraire commodity (l = 1)
exactly if the subsequent shock is s and it is traded at a price ps. An agent’s portfolio of Arrow
securities is denoted by φ(st) ∈ RS , and the vector of Arrow security prices is denote by p ∈ RS++.
While we rule out short-sales in the Lucas tree, we impose no restrictions on trades in the financial
assets. Since in this setting the payoffs of the tree are spanned by the other assets, the constraints
on short-sales are irrelevant. However, they become important in the next section.
A sequential competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices and choices of individuals
(
π(st), p(st), q(st),
(
φa,h(s
t), θa,h(s
t), xa,h(s
t)
)
(a,h)∈A
)
st∈Σ
such that markets clear and agents optimize, i.e. (1) and (2) hold.
(1) Market clearing equations:
∑
(a,h)∈A−A
θa,h(s
t) = 1,
∑
(a,h)∈A−A
φa,h(s
t) = 0,
∑
(a,h)∈A
xa,h(s
t) = ω¯(st), for all s
t ∈ Σ.
(2) For each st and h = 1, . . . , H, individual (st, h) maximizes utility:
(xst,h, θst,h, φst,h) ∈ arg max
x≥0,θ≥0,φ
Ust,h(x) s.t. the constraints (i)-(ii).
(i) Budget constraint for a = 1:
5
π(st) · (x(st)− ω1,h(st)) + p(s
t) · φ(st) + q(st)θ(st) ≤ 0.
(ii) Budget constraints for all a = 2, . . . , A and st+a−1 ≻ st:
π(st+a−1) · (x(st+a−1)− ωa,h(st+a−1))−(
φst+a−1(s
t+a−2) + θ(st+a−2)(q(st+a−1) + π(st+a−1) · d(st+a−1))
)
+
(
p(st+a−1) · φ(st+a−1) + q(st+a−1)θ(st+a−1)
)
≤ 0,
φ(st+A−1) = θ(st+A−1) = 0.
The utility maximization problems for the agents (s1−a, h), a = 2, . . . , A, h = 1, . . . , H, who are
initially alive at t = 0 are analogous to the optimization problems for agents (st, h).
2.2 Negishi’s approach to analyze equilibrium
As Kehoe et al. (1992) point out, the presence of a Lucas tree ensures that competitive equilibria in
this economy are Pareto efficient and that there must exist summable Pareto weights {ηst,h}st∈Σ,h∈H
such that competitive equilibrium allocations satisfy
(xst,h)st∈Σ,h∈H = argmax
x≥0
∑
st∈Σ,h∈H
ηst,hUst,h(xst,h) s.t.
∑
st∈Σ,h∈H
xst,h(σ) ≤ ω¯(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ. (1)
Since we assume time-separable expected utility, we can characterize equilibrium also by using
instantaneous Negishi weights, λ(st) = (λa,h(s
t))(a,h)∈A, defined by
λa,h(s
t) = ηst−a+1,hδa,h(s
t).
Individuals’ consumption is then given as a function X : S × RAH+ → R
AHL
+ of the shock and the
instantaneous weights with
X(s, λ) = arg max
x∈RAHL+
∑
(a,h)∈A
λa,hua,h(xa,h) s.t.
∑
(a,h)∈A
xa,h ≤ ω¯(s). (2)
For λa,h = 0 we take Xa,h = 0 to be the optimal solution (although utility might be minus infinity
at that consumption bundle). Given a process of instantaneous Negishi weights (λ(σ))σ∈Σ, λ(s
t) ∈
R
AH
++ for all s
t, we define for each node st, xa,h(s
t) := Xa,h(st, λ(s
t)).
Then a sequence of Negishi weights
(
(λa,h(s
t))(a,h)∈A
)
st∈Σ
characterizes a financial markets equilibrium if the following two conditions (E1)-(E2) hold.
(E1) Intertemporal Euler equations.
For all h ∈ H and all a = 2, ..., A it holds that λa,h(s
t) = δa,h(st, st−1)λa−1,h(s
t−1).
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(E2) Budget constraints.
Defining the budget of agent (a, h) at node st for all h ∈ H recursively by
wA,h(s
t) := DxuA,h(xA,h(s
t)) ·
(
xA,h(s
t)− ωA,h(s
t)
)
, and for a = 1, ..., A− 1 by
wa,h(s
t) := Dxua,h(xa,h(s
t)) ·
(
xa,h(s
t)− ωa,h(s
t)
)
+
∑
st+1st
δa+1,h(s
t, st+1)wa+1,h(s
t+1),
it holds for all h ∈ H that: w1,h(s
t) = 0.
It is easy to verify that for a sequence of Negishi weights that satisfies conditions (E1)-(E2), there
exist initial conditions and a sequential equilibrium,
(
π¯(st), p¯(st), q¯(st),
(
φ¯a,h(s
t), θ¯a,h(s
t), x¯a,h(s
t)
)
(a,h)∈A
)
st∈Σ
,
with x¯a,h(s
t) = Xa,h(st, λ(s
t)), π¯(st) = 1
∂1,1(st)
Dxu1,1(x1,1(s
t)) and p¯st+1(s
t) =
δ2,1(st,st+1)∂2,1(st+1)
∂1,1(st)
for all st+1  st, where ∂a,h(s
t) := ∂a,h(st, λ(s
t)) :=
∂ua,h(Xa,h(s,λ))
∂x1
. The budget constraints imply
that q¯(st) = −d(st) +
∑
(a,h)∈A
wa,h(s
t)
∂a,h(st)
.
It is somewhat misleading to refer to (E1) as an ’intertemporal Euler equation’. The evolution
of the instantaneous weight λa,h(σ) simply follows from the definition of the planner’s problem.
However, once we introduce incomplete markets we can no longer work with a social planner and
the evolution of instantaneous Negishi weights is then determined by an actual Euler equation.
2.3 Recursive equilibria
Using Negishi’s approach to compute equilibria is useful only if the Negishi weights follow a Markov
process. We refer to such equilibria as ’recursive equilibria’, although it should be clear that they
might or might not be recursive when one uses beginning-of-period portfolios as the state, which
we call the natural state in what follows. A recursive equilibrium is described by a policy function
mapping the state into all agents’ consumption, X(s, λ), and a state transition
Λ : S × S × RAH++ → R
AH
++ .
We take as given a sequential equilibrium described by (λ(st))st∈σ. Clearly this sequential equilib-
rium might fail to be a recursive equilibrium which is the case if the state transition can only be
described by a correspondence and not a function. However, if there is a transition function, we can
describe w(st) recursively using the functions X(s, λ) and Λ(s, s, λ) as follows. Define for all types
h ∈ H the value of their excess consumption (i.e. their budget) to be
WA,h(s, λ) := Dxua,h(XA,h(s, λ)) · (XA,h(s, λ)− ωA,h(s)), (3)
Wa,h(s, λ) := Dxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ)) · (Xa,h(s, λ)− ωa,h(s)) + (4)∑
s′
δa+1,h(s, s
′)Wa+1,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
for all a = 1, ..., A− 1.
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Definition 1 A recursive equilibrium is a function Λ : S × S × RAH++ → R
AH
++ that satisfies for all
s, s′ ∈ S and all λ ∈ RAH++ ,
W1,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ)) = 0 for all h ∈ H and
Λa,h(s, s
′, λ) = δa,h(s, s
′)λa−1,h for all (a, h) ∈ A−1.
It is clear that if such a transition function Λ exists, then it does indeed characterize an equilib-
rium. However, there is in general no guarantee that equilibria exist for which Negishi weights are
Markov. As Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) point out, in economies with overlapping generations
recursive equilibria for the natural state space might fail to exist. Although we have no counter-
example to existence of equilibria that are recursive using Negishi weights, there is no good reason
to believe that these equilibria always exist. However, as we will show below they always exist for
the case of two-period lived agents, A = 2. Moreover, we also show that they always exist if utility
satisfies a gross substitute property. Citanna and Siconolfi (2010) have the clever insight that with
sufficiently many agents per generation recursive equilibrium must exist generically. They prove
their result using the natural state space, but it is clear that a similar approach can be used to
prove generic existence of equilibria with Markovian Negishi weights. However, we want to use the
fact that Negishi weights are Markov to approximate equilibria using Negishi’s method in models
where agents live for many periods. In this case, the number of agents needed for Citanna and
Siconolfi’s result to apply becomes astronomical very fast. It is subject to further research to use
their approach to tackle models with a continuum of ex ante identical agents within each generation,
for all other models it seems of little practical relevance.
When it comes to computing recursive equilibrium below, we consider only minimal recursive
equilibrium, which we define as a recursive equilibrium for which the current (λ1,h)h∈H is a function
of (λa,h)(a,h)∈A−1 . Thus, a recursive equilibrium is said to be minimal if there exists a function
ℓ(s, (λa,h)(a,h)∈A−1) so that Λ1,h(s, s
′, λ) = ℓh
(
s′, (Λa,h(s, s
′, λ))(a,h)∈A−1
)
for all h ∈ H. While
our concept of recursive equilibrium is consistent with the idea of Markov-equilibria where the
state is required to follow a Markov chain, the concept of minimal recursive equilibrium is actually
more easily comparable to recursive equilibria using the natural state space. In that concept, the
endogenous state at a node st consists only of variables that were determined at st−1. Clearly for
each h, λ1,h(s
t) is typically not ’predetermined’ and hence it is not obvious whether it should be
included in the state space. In the computational approach below we search for a minimal recursive
equilibrium. Obviously conditions that ensure existence of a minimal recursive equilibrium must
be stronger than conditions for the existence of a recursive equilibrium. We revisit the existence of
recursive equilibrium and of minimal recursive equilibrium in the next two sections where we prove
general results that apply to models with and without borrowing constraints.
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2.4 Computation
We describe and discuss a simple time iteration collocation method to numerically approximate
minimal recursive equilibria. Time iteration is one of several standard approaches to solve dynamic
non-optimal models (see e.g. Section 7.2. of Judd et al. (2003) or Krueger and Kubler (2004)).
Obviously there are several other approaches which have advantages and disadvantages compared
to time iteration. However, we chose to discuss this algorithm because it makes it easy to compare
our approach to the conventional approach of doing time-iteration using the natural state-space. It
also serves as a basis for computing large-scale models in practice.
We take as given that the functions X(s, λ) can be approximated with high accuracy and neg-
ligible computational cost. For standard calibrations that assume identical homothetic utility this
function is linear after a change of variable. For the case of one commodity there are several other
classes of preferences for which closed-form solutions are known.
As we solve for a minimal recursive equilibrium, the endogenous state consist of (λa,h)(a,h)∈A−1
while (λ1,h) is described by the function ℓ. Note that we could normalize (λa,h)(a,h)∈A−1 to lie
on the unit simplex, yet it more straightforward to describe the algorithm without this normal-
ization. To simplify notation, we define a vector λ˜ := (λa,h)(a,h)∈A−1 . Given ℓ(s, λ), we are
only interested in W (s, λ) for values of λ that satisfy (λ1h)h∈H = ℓ(s, λ˜). We therefore define
W˜ (s, λ˜) := W (s, (ℓ(s, λ˜), λ˜))).
We assume that the unknown functions W˜ (s, λ˜) and ℓ(s, λ˜) can be well approximated by some
Wˆ (s, λ˜) and ℓˆ(s, λ˜) that are uniquely determined by the requirement that Wˆa,h(s, λ˜
i) = Wa,h(s, λ˜
i)
and ℓˆh(s, λ˜
i) = ℓ(s, λ˜i) for some finite number G of so-called ’collocation points’ λ˜i ∈ G ⊂ R
(A−1)H
++ ,
i = 1, ..., G. Examples of functions commonly used for collocation methods include Smolyak-
polynomials as in Krueger and Kubler (2004) or splines as in Judd et al. (2003). Recall that
for expositional reasons, we do not normalize the state variable to lie in the unit simplex. Thus,
all functions are homogeneous of degree zero in λ˜, thus we can easily redefine them over compact
domains. The main steps of the algorithm are as follows.
1. Set n = 0 and start with an initial guess Wˆ 0 : S × R
(A−1)H
+ → R
(A−1)H .
2. Given Wˆn, for each s ∈ S and each λ˜i ∈ G, compute ℓˆn+1(s, λ˜i) as a solution to the system of
equations
Dxu1,h(X1,h(s, λ
i(s))) · (X1,h(s, λ
i(s))−ω1,h) +
∑
s′
δ2,h(s, s
′)Wˆn2,h(s
′, λ˜i(s′)) = 0, h ∈ H, (5)
where λi(s) = (ℓˆn+1(s, λ˜i), λ˜i) and λ˜i(s′) = (δa,h(s, s
′)λia−1,h(s))(a,h)∈A−1 .
3. For each s ∈ S and each λ˜i ∈ G, let λi(s) and λ˜i(s′) be given as before and compute for all
(a, h) ∈ A−1
Wˆn+1a,h (s, λ˜
i) = Dxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ
i(s)))·(Xa,h(s, λ
i(s))−ωa,h)+
∑
s′
δa+1,h(s, s
′)Wˆna+1,h(s
′, λ˜i(s′)),
where Wˆn+1A+1,h(s, λ˜
i) := 0.
4. For each s ∈ S, interpolate {Wˆn+1(s, λ˜i), i = 1, ..., G} to obtain approximating functions
Wˆn+1(s, .).
5. Check some error criterion. If error criterion is not met, increase n by 1 and go to 2.
6. Set Wˆ ∗ = Wˆn+1 and interpolate ℓˆn(s, λ˜i) to obtain ℓˆ∗(s, .).
In Section 4 below, we give conditions under which the algorithm converges, assuming an ide-
alized situation without error in the function-approximation. In general, the system of equations
(5) might have no solutions, or it might have several solutions. Furthermore, there is no guarantee
that Wˆn converges as n tends to infinity. This is obvious as there is generally no guarantee that
a (minimal recursive) equilibrium exists. Feng et al. (2013) develop a method which can be used
to compute generalized Markov equilibria in this setting. However, for reasonable values of A the
method is not applicable as it suffers from a severe curse of dimensionality.
In this simple framework with complete markets, it is clear that using Negishi weights as state
variables has important advantages over the ’standard’ approach that uses beginning-of-period cash-
at-hand. Most importantly, the computational complexity barely increases with the number of
goods, L. Only the computation of X(s, λ) and of Dxua,h(X(s, λ)) depends on L. This is in stark
contrast to the case of cash-at-hand as endogenous state variable where one needs to solve for spot-
prices and allocations simultaneously with portfolios and asset-prices. We will return to this issue
in Section 4 below.
Even for the case of a single commodity the Negishi-approach has three important advantages
over conventional methods: First, as policies are homogeneous of degree zero in Negishi weights,
policy functions may be defined over the (A − 1)H − 1 dimensional unit simplex (for given states
today and tomorrow). Thus the admissible set is simple and can easily be worked with, while it can
be arbitrarily complicated in the case of the natural state space. Since agents do not face borrowing
constraints, young agents typically borrow substantial amounts and one thus has to determine the
’natural’ borrowing limits as one step of the computations. For models with large H and/or A this
can result in substantial difficulties. Second, along the time iteration the only costly computation
consists of solving for ℓˆ(s, λ˜i) in Step 2 above. For each s and λ˜i, this is a non-linear system of
H equations in as many unknowns. In contrast, for the case of cash-at-hand, one needs to solve
all agents’ first order conditions plus market clearing conditions simultaneously to obtain optimal
choices and prices. This results in (A − 1)HS equations for each s and λ˜i (if market clearing
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conditions are used to express one agent’s portfolio in terms of all others’). Even for moderate A
and S this can be an order of magnitude larger, thus an enormous efficiency gain can be realized if
Negishi-weights are used. Note also, that the dynamics of the economy is fully captured by the HS
functions (ℓh(s, .))s∈S,h∈H. If cash-at-hand is used instead, one needs to keep track of (A− 1)HS
2
functions, for each current shock s mapping cash-at-hand of all generations but the oldest into
their cash-at-hand at all successor nodes. Thus, the Negishi approach reduces both the number
of equations that have to be solved simultaneously as well as the number of functions that are
needed to characterize equilibrium dynamics by a factor of (A − 1)S. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, error analysis is trivial to conduct if we use Negishi-weights. As mentioned above, the
error in computing X(s, λ) can typically be taken to be negligible. Given a transition ℓˆ, the errors
in the computation of Wˆ are pure function-approximation errors and there are reliable methods
to bound them above. As explained for example in Kubler and Schmedders (2005) it is generally
impossible to find bounds on how close a computed approximation is to an exact equilibrium. In
the current context, it is impossible to determine how close the computed evolution of λ is to the
exact equilibrium evolution. Given approximations Wˆ and ℓˆ for the unknown policy functions, the
only relevant error is MAXERR = sup
h∈H,s∈S,λ˜∈R(A−1)H ‖
Wˆ1,h(s
′,ℓˆ(s,λ˜))
∂1,h(s,λ˜)
‖. This can be interpreted
as the maximal transfer necessary to turn the computed allocation into an equilibrium allocation.
That is, while we cannot guarantee in general that the computed allocation is close to an exact
equilibrium allocation, it is always close to an equilibrium allocation of an economy with transfers.
The size of the transfers is bounded by MAXERR. Kubler and Schmedders (2005) suggest a
similar interpretation for the case of the natural state. However, in their method one needs to
transform the error in the computation into an error that has an economic interpretation. Using
Negishi-weights as state variable has the advantage that the error in the computation translates
directly to an interpretable approximation error.
3 The general model
We now generalize the above model by introducing borrowing constraints and the possibility of
incomplete financial markets. We assume that there are J ≤ S financial securities with stationary
payoffs, i.e. security j pays bj(s) units of the numéraire commodity in shock s. Budget constraints
and borrowing constraints for agent (st, h) read as follows
(i) Budget constraint for a = 1:
π(st) · (x(st)− ω1,h(st)) + p(s
t) · φ(st) + q(st)θ(st) ≤ 0.
(ii) Budget constraints for all a = 2, . . . , A and st+a−1  st:
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π(st+a−1) · (x(st+a−1)− ωa,h(st+a−1))−(
φ(st+a−2) · b(st+a−1) + θ(st+a−2)(q(st+a−1) + π(st+a−1) · d(st+a−1))
)
+
p(st+a−1) · φ(st+a−1) + q(st+a−1)θ(st+a−1) ≤ 0,
φ(st+A−1) = θ(st+A−1) = 0.
(iii) Borrowing constraint for all a = 1, ..., A− 1 and st+a ≻ st:
φ(st+a−1) · b(st+a−1) + θ(st+a−1)(q(st+a) + π(st+1) · d(st+a)) ≥ −D(s
t+a).
This borrowing constraint demands that the value in st+a of the portfolio bought in st+a−1 has
to exceed −D(st+a), i.e. the net repayment obligation in st+a may not exceed D(st+a). On the left
hand side of the borrowing constraint, short positions in financial assets might be offset by long
positions in other financial assets or the Lucas tree. This means that these long positions may be
used as collateral for borrowing. The additional amount that agents are able to borrow, which is
represented by D(st+a), is determined by the assumption that agents may borrow against part of
their future endowments. We denote this part of their endowments by fa,h(s
t) ≥ 0. These are
tangible resources that can be pledged to finance consumption and asset purchases at a time before
they are received (see Gottardi and Kubler (2012)). The remaining part of an agents endowments
is non-pledgeable and assumed to be positive for all st. It is denoted by ea,h(s
t). Total endowments
of agent (a, h) are thus given by
ωa,h(σ) = ea,h(σ) + fa,h(σ) for all σ.
We assume that both components depend only on the current shock: ea,h(s
t) = ea,h(st), fa,h(s
t) =
fa,h(st). To understand how the debt limit D(s
t+a) is determined it is helpful to first consider the
case where agents can trade in a complete set of assets. In this case agents can borrow against the
current value of their future f -endowments. Thus, for all a = 1, ..., A and st+a ≻ st:
D(st+a) =
∑
st+ist+a
ρ(st+i)
ρ(st+a)
π(st+i) · fi,h(s
t+i),
were ρ(st) denotes the Arrow-Debreu price of consumption of the numeraire good at node st.
If the set of available assets is not complete, then the debt limit cannot be derived in closed-
form. Instead, we provide a recursive definition of the debt limit starting with the final period of
an agent’s life. In that period, an agent has to repay all his debt. Thus, the repayment obligations
that he enters that period with may not exceed the f-endowments that he earns in that period:
D(st+A−1) = π(st+A−1) · fA,h(s
t+A−1).
Given debt limits at all st+a ≻ st+a−1, the debt limit for st+a−1 is given by
D(st+a−1) = π(st+a−1) · fa,h(s
t+a−1)− max
φ∈RS ,θ≥0
(p(st+a−1) · φ+ q(st+a−1)θ)
s.t. φ · b(st+a) + θ(q(s
t+a+1) + π(st+a+1) · d(st+1)) +D(s
t+a) ≥ 0 for all st+a ≻ st+a−1.
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This is saying that the repayment obligations that an agent faces at date-event st+a−1 may not
exceed the sum of his f-endowments plus the maximum amount that he may borrow subject to the
constraint that he does not violate his debt limit in any of the subsequent periods. In other words,
debt must be repayable by a trading strategy that finances itself entirely through f -endowments.
Note that despite the fact that we throughout impose the restrictions θ(st) ≥ 0, it is important
to allow trading in the tree in the definition of D(st+a−1). If an agent has high f -endowments in
one state, but the price of the tree is high in another state, the agent might want to buy the tree
to be able to short a risk-free asset that allows him to borrow against both states.
Competitive equilibrium (with borrowing constraints and possibly incomplete markets) is defined
as before - agents maximize utility subject to constraints (i) - (iii) and markets clear. Our general
description of borrowing constraints has three well known special cases. First, full spanning in
which case the borrowing constraints simplifies considerably as we have seen above. Second, if
e-endowments are all zero, then our borrowing constraint is nothing but a natural borrowing limit.
Third, if f -endowments are all zero, then agents can borrow only against the value of their long
positions in the Lucas tree or financial securities, i.e. agents face a collateral constraint. With
incomplete markets, the constraint needs to take into account that the future endowments can only
be sold through the existing assets. In this case, the assumption that default is not possible is
crucial as default might result in payoffs that are not possible through trade in the incomplete set of
financial securities. If one wants to allow for default, one needs to model asset-specific margins (see
Gottardi and Kubler (2012)) – many of the results below will also hold for such a model, however,
in order to make the analysis consistent we choose to rule out default both in the case of complete
markets and incomplete markets.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization via Negishi weights
As in the complete market case, we can characterize competitive equilibria by a sequence of in-
stantaneous Negishi weights. Without the interpretation of Negishi weights as welfare weights in a
social planner’s problem, there are infinitely many sequences of weights that give rise to the same
allocation. We can therefore choose a normalization each period and it is useful to choose one that
simplifies to our earlier definition in the case of complete markets.
Somewhat similarly to the ’Cass-trick’ (see Cass (2006)) we take the evolution of one agent’s
Negishi weight λ to be the same as in complete markets. Without loss of generality, we take this to
be agent (1, 1).
It is easy to see that competitive equilibrium is characterized by budget equations and first order
conditions (see e.g. Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004)). A sequence of Negishi weights
(
(λa,h(s
t))(a,h)∈A
)
st∈Σ
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characterizes a financial markets equilibrium if there exist portfolios and multipliers
(
(φa,h(σ), θa,h(σ), ζa,h(σ), χa,h(σ))(a,h)∈A
)
σ∈Σ
,
such that conditions (E1)-(E4) below hold for all st given the following definitions. As before, we use
xa,h(s
t) := Xa,h(s
t, λ(st)), ∂a,h(s
t) :=
∂ua,h(Xa,h(s,λ))
∂x1
, and we define the budget of agents recursively
by
wA,h(s
t) := DxuA,h(xA,h(s
t)) · (xA,h(s
t)− ωA,h(s
t)) for all h = 1, . . . , H
and for all (a, h) ∈ A−A,
wa,h(s
t) := Dxua,h(xa,h(s
t)) · (xa,h(s
t)− ωa,h(s
t)) +
∑
st+1≻st
δa+1,h(st, st+1)
(
1 +
ζa+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a+1,h(st)
)
wa+1,h(st+1).
Prices are defined by:
π(st) :=
1
∂1,1(st)
Dxu1,1(x(s
t))
q(st) :=
∑
(a,h)∈A
wa,h(s
t)
∂a,h(st)
− d(st)
p(st) :=
∑
st+1≻st
δ2,1(st, st+1)
∂2,1(s
t+1) + ζ2,1(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
b(st+1)
The value of f-endowments is defined recursively by
vA,h(s
t) := Dxua,h(xa,h(s
t)) · (xA,h(s
t)− eA,h(s
t)) for all h = 1, . . . , H
and for all (a, h) ∈ A−A,
va,h(s
t) := max
φ∈RS ,θ≥0
Dxua,h(xa,h(s
t)) · (xa,h(s
t)− ea,h(s
t))− ∂a,h(s
t)(p(st) · φ+ q(st)θ) s.t.
φ · b(st+1) + θ · (p(s
t+1) + π(st+1) · d(st+1)) +
va+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a+1,h(st+1)
≥ 0 for all st+1 ≻ st.
With these definitions the equilibrium conditions read as follows.
(E1) Intertemporal Euler equations.
For agent (1,1) we have
λ2,1(s
t+1) = δ2,1(st, st+1)λ1,1(s
t) + η2,1(s
t+1) for all st+1 ≻ st,
where η2,1(s
t+1) := ζ2,1(s
t+1)
λ1,1(st)δ2,1(st,st+1)
∂2,1(st+1)
.
For all (a, h) ∈ A−A with (a, h) 6= (1, 1) we have
q(st) = χa,h(s
t) +
∑
st+1≻st
δa+1,h(st, st+1)λa,h(s
t) + ηa+1,h(s
t+1)
λa+1,h(st+1)
δ2,1(st, st+1)
∂2,1(s
t+1) + ζ2,1(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
(q(st+1) + π(st+1) · d(st+1))
p(st) =
∑
st+1≻st
δa+1,h(st, st+1)λa,h(s
t) + ηa+1,h(s
t+1)
λa+1,h(st+1)
δ2,1(st, st+1)
∂2,1(s
t+1) + ζ2,1(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
b(st+1),
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where ηa+1,h(s
t+1) := ζa+1,h(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
∂2,1(st+1)+ζ2,1(st+1)
λa+1,h(s
t+1)δa+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a,h(st)δ2,1(st,st+1)
.
(E2) Budget constraints.
For all h ∈ H it holds that:
w1,h(s
t) = 0 for all h ∈ H and all st.
(E3) Short sale constraints and spanning conditions.
For all st and all (a, h) ∈ A−A:
θa,h(s
t) ≥ 0, θa,h(s
t)χa,h(s
t) = 0,
and for all st+1 ≻ st,
wa+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a+1,h
= θa,h(s
t)
(
q(st+1) + π(st+1) · d(st+1)
)
+ φa,h(s
t) · b(st+1).
(E4) Debt constraints.
For all (a, h) ∈ A and all st it holds that:
va,h(s
t) ≥ 0, ζa,h(s
t)va,h(s
t) = 0.
Clearly, the equilibrium definition via Negishi weights is more complicated in the general setup
than in the complete markets case. Two parts of the definition require an explanation.
First, the evolution of the Negishi weights is the same as in complete markets only for agent
(1, 1). For all other agents, the evolution is implicitly given by the intertemporal Euler equations
p(st) =
∑
st+1≻st
δa+1,h(st, st+1)λa,h(s
t) + ηa+1,h(s
t+1)
λa+1,h(st+1)
δ2,1(st, st+1)
∂2,1(s
t+1) + ζ2,1(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
b(st+1).
To rewrite this Euler equation, we use that
δa+1,h(st, st+1)λa,h(s
t)
λa+1,h(st+1)
δ2,1(st, st+1)
∂2,1(s
t+1) + ζ2,1(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
= δa+1,h(st, st+1)
λa,h(s
t)
λa+1,h(st+1)
(
δ2,1(st, st+1)λ1,1(s
t) + η2,1(s
t+1)
)
∂2,1(s
t+1)
λ1,1(st)∂1,1(st)
= δa+1,h(st, st+1)
λa,h(s
t)
λa+1,h(st+1)
λ2,1(s
t+1)∂2,1(s
t+1)
λ1,1(st)∂1,1(st)
= δa+1,h(st, st+1)
∂a+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a,h(st)
and
ηa+1,h(s
t+1)
λa+1,h(st+1)
δ2,1(st, st+1)
∂2,1(s
t+1) + ζ2,1(s
t+1)
∂1,1(st)
= δa+1,h(st, st+1)
ζa+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a,h(st)
,
which results in the standard intertemporal Euler equation
p(st) =
∑
st+1≻st
δa+1,h(st, st+1)
∂a+1,h(s
t+1) + ζa+1,h(s
t+1)
∂a,h(st)
b(st+1).
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Second, debt constraints are now more complicated as well. To understand why va,h(s
t) ≥ 0
captures the borrowing constraint (iii) above, we show by induction that
va,h(s
t) = Da,h(s
t) + φ(st−1) · b(st) + θ(st−1)(q(st) + π(st) · d(st)).
We start the induction with vA,h(s
t+a−1) where we just need the budget constraint at that age to
show that the above equation holds. For a < A we get from the definition of va,h and the budget
constraint that
va,h(s
t) = π(st) · f(st) + φ(st−1) · b(st) + θ(s
t−1) · (q(st) + π(st) · d(st+1))
−(p(st) · φ(st) + q(st)θ(st))− max
φ˜∈RS ,θ˜≥0
(p(st) · φ˜+ q(st)θ˜)
s.t. φ˜ · b(st+1) + θ˜(q(s
t+1) + π(st+1) · d(st+1)) + va+1,h(s
t+1) ≥ 0 for all st+1 ≻ st.
Using the induction hypothesis we can rewrite the side condition for the maximization as
s.t. (φ(st)+ φ˜) ·b(st+1)+(θ(s
t)+ θ˜)(q(st+1)+π(st+1) ·d(st+1))+Da+1,h(s
t+1) ≥ 0 for all st+1 ≻ st.
Defining φˆ = (φ+ φ˜) and θˆ = (φ+ θ˜), we get
va,h(s
t) = π(st) · f(st) + φ(st−1) · b(st) + θ(s
t−1) · (q(st) + π(st) · d(st+1))
− max
φˆ∈RS ,θˆ≥0
(p(st) · φˆ+ q(st)θˆ)
s.t. φˆ · b(st+1) + θˆ(q(s
t+1) + π(st+1) · d(st+1)) +Da+1,h(s
t+1) ≥ 0 for all st+1 ≻ st.
Comparing this representation of va,h(s
t) with the definition of Da,h(s
t) shows that
va,h(s
t) = Da,h(s
t) + φ(st−1) · b(st) + θ(st−1)(q(st) + π(st) · d(st)),
which implies that va,h(s
t) ≥ 0 is equivalent to the borrowing constraint (iii).
3.2 Recursive equilibrium
As before we aim to find equilibria for which (st, λ(s
t)) follow a Markov process. We say that the
function Λ : S × S × RAH+ → R
AH
+ characterizes a recursive equilibrium if for each initial condition
s0 and λ(s0) there exists a financial markets equilibrium with λ(st+1) = Λ(st, st+1, λ(s
t)) for all st
and st+1 ≻ st. In this case we can define Wa,h(st, λ(s
t)) := wa,h(s
t) and Va,h(st, λ(s
t)) := va,h(s
t).
In the case of incomplete markets, it is not obvious that the use of instantaneous Negishi weights
as endogenous state variables provides large computational advantages. We discuss the issue in
Section 4.1 below.
As in the complete markets case general existence of a recursive equilibrium is an open issue.
However, it is easy to show that for A = 2 recursive equilibria always exist (this is in contrast to
the case of the natural state space, where Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) show that recursive
equilibria might fail to exist even if A = 2. This follows directly from the existence of a so-called
’generalized Markov equilibrium’ where additional endogenous variables enter the state.
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3.2.1 Generalized Markov equilibria
Following the proof in Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) or in Citanna and Siconolfi (2011), one can
show that there exist correspondences Λ : S×S×RAH+ ⇒ R
AH
+ , V : S×R
AH
+ ⇒ R
AH , andW : S×
R
AH
+ ⇒ R
AH , such that there exists a financial markets equilibrium with λ(st+1) ∈ Λ(st, st+1, λ(s
t))
for all st and all st+1 ≻ st, where wa,h(s
t) ∈Wa,h(st, λ(s
t)), va,h(s
t) ∈ Va,h(st, λ(s
t)). The key step
of the proof1 is to apply Proposition 1 in Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) in our framework. To
do this, one has to redefine the expectations correspondence using (E1)-(E4). The only technical
difficulty then lies in showing existence of a T-horizon equilibrium for arbitrary first period Negishi-
weights. It is standard to show existence for an open set of initial conditions (i.e. tree-holdings
among the initially alive). The proof in Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) can be directly applied.
In order to show existence for arbitrary initial Negishi weights, one simply alters the best-response
correspondence of the initially young. For each agent initially alive, by the intermediate value
theorem, one can find a continuous map from prices and first period consumption to life-time
consumption after the initial period and first period initial cash-at-hand so that with that cash-at-
hand, given prices, life-time consumption maximizes utility given the budget constraints. This map
is continuous in prices and a standard fixed point argument shows existence of an equilibrium for
arbitrary first period consumption.
To show that there exists a ’generalized’ Markov equilibrium where the state space is enlarged
to contain not only instantaneous weights but also current values of v and w, we need to show that
there exists a function T (s, s′, λ, v, w) such that
(λ(st+1), v(st+1), w(st+1)) = T (st, st+1, λ(s
t), v(st), w(st))
for all st and all st+1 ≻ st. To do so, first note that we must have that for all st: q(st) + d(st) =∑
(a,h)∈A
wa,h(s
t)
∂a,h(st)
. Second, note that the requirements (E1)-(E4) all only involve values of v, w, q and
λ in the current period and at all nodes of the subsequent period. Therefore if there is an equilibrium
that is not Markov in the enlarged state space (v, w, λ) we can construct a new equilibrium that
is. I.e. if at two nodes σ and σ˜ with the same current shock s we have that (v(σ), w(σ), λ(σ)) =
(v(σ˜), w(σ˜), λ(σ˜)) but there are direct successor σ+ of σ and σ˜+ of σ˜ with the same shock but
different values for v, w, λ, i.e. (v(σ+), w(σ+), λ(σ+)) 6= (v(σ˜+), w(σ˜+), λ(σ˜+)), we can just replace
all endogenous variables at the direct successor nodes of σ˜ by the endogenous variables of the direct
successor nodes of σ. The conditions (E1)-(E4) must then be satisfied and since they are necessary
and sufficient for equilibrium, this must be a new equilibrium that is Markov in the extended state
space. Citanna and Siconolfi (2011) and Duffie et al (1994, Section 2.5)) develop a similar argument
for the case of cash-at-hand as a state variable.
Finally note that in equilibrium we must always have that W1,h(s, λ) = {0} and that there is
1A full proof is available from the authors upon request.
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a function from (s, λ, (va,h, wa,h)(a,h)∈A−1) to (v1,h)h∈H. As in the above argument, if in a given
equilibrium there occur different values of v1,h for given (s, λ, (va,h, wa,h)(a,h)∈A−1) we can construct
a new equilibrium by picking one of them.
These observation gives rise to the following simple lemma.
Lemma 1 Given a generalised Markov equilibrium with V(s, λ) and W(s, λ), there exists a recursive
equilibrium if Va,h(s, λ) andWa,h(s, λ) are single valued for all (a, h) ∈ A−1.
It is noteworthy that in the case of no constraints, the correspondence V is irrelevant. In
this case, wa,h(s
t) simply denotes agent (a, h)’s cash-at-hand at node st. If a given Negishi-weight
can only be supported by a single value for cash-at-hand across agents there must be a recursive
equilibrium.
3.2.2 Two period lived agents
It is easy to see that for the case A = 2 the existence of a generalized Markov equilibrium directly
implies existence of a recursive equilibrium. This is because we obtain
V2,h(s, λ) = {
1
∂2,h(st)
Dxu2,h(X2,h(s, λ)) · (X2,h(s, λ)− e2,h)}, and
W2,h(s, λ) = {
1
∂2,h(st)
Dxu2,h(X2,h(s, λ)) · (X2,h(s, λ)− ω2,h)},
which shows that both correspondences are single valued. By Lemma 1 there must therefore exist
a function Λ(s, s, λ) that describes the equilibrium evolution of λ - a recursive equilibrium always
exists.
This simple general existence result is in contrast to the case of the natural state space. In
this case, as Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) show, recursive equilibrium might fail to exist even
if A = 2. However, this seems to be an artefact of the assumption of two-period lived agents. In
particular, the result does not imply that there always exist minimal recursive equilibria. In fact
the strategy from Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) can be used to find simple counter-examples.
As it is well known, in the case without constraints and with complete financial markets, a
model with A-period lived agents can always be reduced to a two period model (see e.g. Balasko
et al. (1980)). For this two-period model, recursive equilibria always exist. However, if one recalls
how the construction works it becomes clear that existence of a recursive equilibrium in the two-
period reduction does not say more than the existence of a generalised Markov equilibrium. In the
construction all agents born within A− 1 periods are grouped together. The state then consists of
all these agents instantaneous Negishi weights – even if H = 1, we then have a A − 1 +
∑A−1
a=1 S
a
dimensional endogenous state space. This is clearly not in the spirit of recursive equilibrium.
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3.2.3 Log-utility
We now assume as in Huffman (1987) that for all a > 2 and all h, ua,h(x) =
∑L
l=1 αa,h,l log xl and
ωa,h = 0. For this very restricted case recursive equilibria always exist, independently of A, the
market structure and borrowing constraints. Since for this case Dxu(x)·x is a constant, independent
of x, it is easy to see that for a > 2, va,h and wa,h are constants, just depending on (a, h) and the
current state s. Therefore Va,h(s, λ) andWa,h(s, λ) must be single-valued for all a > 1 and all h.
By the previous argument, a recursive equilibrium must always exist.
4 Two important special cases
It is useful to discuss in detail two important special cases of our model. First we assume that
financial markets are incomplete but that agents face no constraints on their trades (i.e. neither
borrowing constraints nor short-sale constraints on the stock). This case plays an important role
in finance and macro-economics and we want to compare the computational burden of the Negishi
approach with that of the standard approach that uses cash-at-hand as a state-variable.
Secondly, we examine the case where agents can trade in a complete set of Arrow securities but
face borrowing constraints. We refer to this case as ’full-spanning’. Gottardi and Kubler (2012)
examine this case for a model with infinitely lived agents and it turns out that competitive equilibria
are often constrained inefficient. However, they also show that the assumption of gross substitutes
guarantees existence if agents are infinitely lived. We show that this assumption suffices for existence
of recursive equilibria in OLG models with borrowing constraints.
4.1 Unconstrained incomplete markets
We first assume that markets are incomplete but that there are no e-endowments and discuss
computational issues. We modify the model slightly in that we allow for short-sales in the stock –
while this can lead to failures of existence of a competitive equilibrium, these cases are non-robust
and the assumption of unlimited short-sales allows us to focus on the consequences of missing
financial markets.
Let Wa,h(s, λ) be defined as in (3) and (4), and ∂a,h(s, λ) =
∂ua,h(Xa,h(s,λ))
∂x1
.
Define prices by:
π(s, λ) :=
1
∂1,1(s, λ)
Dxu1,1(xa,h(s, λ)), q(s, λ) :=
∑
(a,h)∈A
Wa,h(s, λ)
∂a,h(s, λ)
− d(s),
p(s, λ) :=
∑
s′≻s
δ2,1(s, s
′,Λ2,1(s, s
′, λ))
∂2,1(s
′)
∂1,1(s)
b(s′).
A transition function Λ(s, s′, λ) with Λ2,1(s, s
′, λ) = δ2,1(s, s
′)λ1,1 defines a recursive equilibrium
with incomplete markets if it satisfies, in addition to the requirement that W1h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ)) = 0
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for all h ∈ H, that for all (a, h) ∈ A−A \ {(1, 1)},
q(s, λ) =
∑
s′
δa+1,h(s, s
′)λa,h
Λa+1,h(s, s′, λ)
· (6)
δ2,1(s, s
′)∂2,1(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
(
q(s′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
∂1,1(s, λ)
+ π(s,Λ(s, s′, λ))) · d(s′)
)
p(s, λ) =
∑
s′
δa+1,h(s, s
′)λa,h
Λa+1,h(s, s′, λ)
δ2,1(s, s
′)
∂2,1(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
∂1,1(s, λ)
b(s′), (7)
and if for each (a, h) ∈ A−A \ {(1, 1)} there exists φ ∈ R
J and θ ∈ R such that
Wa+1,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
∂a+1,h(s′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
= θa,h
(
q(s′,Λ(s, s′, λ)) + π(s,Λ(s, s′, λ)) · d(s′)
)
+ φa,h · b(s
′). (8)
Note that the definition simplifies considerably if there exist Arrow-securities for some states
but not for others. For the shocks where agents can trade in an Arrow security the instantaneous
Negishi-weight evolves according to the same rule as for complete markets. We want to argue that
even outside of this special case, using Negishi-weights faciliates the computation of equilibria. As
Chien et al. (2011) point out the use of Negishi-weights also has large advantages in models with
limited market participation. If some agents can trade in a complete set of Arrow securities while
others only have access to a limited set of assets our definition of recursive equilibrium simplifies
for those who trade in Arrow-securities.
4.1.1 Computation
The computational algorithm is as in Section 2 above with the big difference that in Step 2 one
needs to solve a more complicated system of non-linear equations. Instead of solving a system with
H equations and unknowns we now need to solve H+((A−1)H−1)S+((A−1)H−1)J equations.
The additional equations arise because of missing financial markets. Given Wˆn, for a given shock
s and a given collocation-point λ˜i, one needs to solve
Dxu1,h(X1,h(s, λ
i(s))) · (X1,h(s, λ
i(s))− ω1,h) +
∑
s′
δ2,h(s, s
′)Wˆn(s′, Λˆ(s, s′, λ˜i(s′))) = 0, h ∈ H
together with (6), (7) and (8), resulting in H + ((A− 1)H − 1)(J +1)+ ((A− 1)H − 1)S equations
in the unknowns
(λi1,h)h∈H, Λˆ(s, s
′, λi), and (θa,h, φa,h)(a,h)∈A−A\{(1,1)},
where Λˆ(s, s′, λi) just consists of λa,h for (a, h) ∈ A−1 \ {(2, 1)}. A significant efficiency gain can be
obtained by noting that for given (λ1,h)h∈H and (θah, φa,h), Equations (8) can be solved separately
to obtain Λˆ(s, s′, λi). Along the iteration, this can typically be done efficiently using starting-points
from previous iterations. Taken as given a map from (λ1,h)h∈H and (θah, φa,h) to Λˆ(s, s
′, λi), the
computational burden reduces to solving H + ((A− 1)H − 1)J equations and unknowns.
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This is comparable to the case of cash-at-hand where one needs to solve for agents’ cash-at-hand
in the subsequent period – since prices depend on cash-at-hand this is also a fixed-point problem
that gives cash-at-hand at all S shocks next period given the portfolios today. However, for the
case of one good, the number of equations one needs to solve in this case might actually be slightly
smaller since one does not need to solve for (λ1,h)h∈H resulting in H fewer equations and unknowns.
Yet one does need to solve for J + 1 prices, but if J is small and H is large the resulting system
might be smaller.
However, for the case of several commodities, the number of equations to be solved in the Negishi-
approach is independent of L while each additional good results in H + 1 additional equations if
one uses cash-at-hand. It is clear that if there are several goods, the Negishi-approach results in
large efficiency gains.
It is an open question whether the Negishi-approach has significant advantages for the case of
one commodity. Dumas and Lyasoff (2011) argue that for infinitely lived agents this is the case
– it is certainly true that the problem of bounding the endogenous state space might turn out to
be insurmountable if one uses cash-at-hand as the state. On the other hand, it is no longer true
that the number of unknown functions is much smaller for the Negishi approach than it is for the
’natural state-space’ approach.
4.2 Full spanning with constraints
In this subsection, we show that in the presence of a full set of Arrow-securities the model with
borrowing constraints is tractable and in many respects quite similar to the complete markets model.
It is useful to first spell out how our definition of recursive equilibrium simplifies in the case of full
spanning. As before it is useful to evaluate all consumptions in terms of agents’ marginal utility. In
the case of complete markets, i.e. full spanning without constraints, this was straightforward. With
constraints, we have to change the setup slightly and modify the definition of the functions W (s, .).
Note that for all nodes st it follows from the first order conditions of the planner problem that
λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))) are identical across all agents alive at that node. Furthermore, we
must have that for each subsequent node there is at least one agent that is unconstrained. For
this agent we have that λa+1,h(s
t+1) = δa+1,h(st, st+1)λa,h(s
t). Therefore we must have that for
any agent, throughout his life-time, λa,hDxua,h are collinear to market-prices even if Dxua,h are not
because of constraints. We define for all types h ∈ H
WA,h(s, λ) = λa,hDxua,h(XA,h(s, λ)) · (XA,h(s, λ)− ωA,h(s)), and
Wa,h(s, λ) = λa,hDxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ)) · (Xa,h(s, λ)− ωa,h(s)) +
∑
s′
Wa+1,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
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for all a = 1, ..., A− 1. Similarly, we define the value of excess consumption to be
VA,h(s, λ) = λA,hDxua,h(XA,h(s, λ)) · (XA,h(s, λ)− eA,h(s)), and
Va,h(s, λ) = λa,hDxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ)) · (Xa,h(s, λ)− ea,h(s)) +
∑
s′
Va+1,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))
for all a = 1, ..., A− 1. We then have the following definition of a recursive equilibrium.
Definition 2 A recursive equilibrium is a function Λ : S × S × RAH++ → R
AH
++ that satisfies for all
h ∈ H, all λ ∈ RAH++ , all s, s
′ ∈ S, and some η ∈ RAH+
W1,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ)) = 0, Λ1,h(s, s
′, λ) = η1,h, and
Λa,h(s, s
′, λ) = δa,hλa−1,h + ηa,h,
Va,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ)) ≥ 0, Va,h(s
′,Λ(s, s′, λ))ηa,h = 0 for all a = 2, ..., A.
Note that this definition is substantially simpler than the requirements (E1)-(E4) above. The
fact that there is a full set of Arrow-securities and that for each Arrow-security at least one of the
agents is always unconstrained simplifies the characterization of equilibrium substantially. As in
the complete markets case, we define a recursive equilibrium to be minimal if there is a function
ℓ(s, (λa,h)(a,h)∈A−1) so that Λ1,h(s, s
′, λ) = ℓh
(
s′, (Λa,h(s, s
′, λ))(a,h)∈A−A
)
for all h ∈ H.
4.2.1 Gross substitutes
For the case of full spanning with constraints we can show that the assumption of gross substitutes
ensures that minimal recursive equilibria always exist (as in Gottardi and Kubler (2012) for the
case of infinitely lived agents and a single commodity). The following definition is standard.
Definition 3 A function F : Rm+ → R
m satisfies the strict gross substitute property if for all y ∈ Rm+
and all x ∈ Rm+ with xi = 0 for some i = 1, ...,m it holds that Fi(y) > Fi(y + x). It satisfies the weak
gross substitute property if the inequality holds weakly.
The gross substitutes assumption is easy to verify if there is a single commodity per state, but
we formulate the result generally, for L commodities. In order to state a gross substitute assumption
for the case of several commodities it is useful to define the set of fundamentals, F ⊂ RL++, to be the
set of all possible realization of endowments and dividends, i.e. F = {ea,h(s), fa,h(s), d(s); (a, h) ∈
A, s ∈ S}. We have the following assumption on Bernoulli functions across all agents.
Assumption 1 For all agents (a, h) and all shocks s ∈ S, the function Dxua,h(X(s, λ)) ·X(s, λ) satis-
fies the weak gross substitute property in λ. Moreover, for each y ∈ F the function −Dxua,h(X(s, λ)) ·y
satisfies the strict gross substitute property in λ.
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For the case of a single good, Dana (1994) uses these assumptions to show uniqueness in a model
with complete markets. It is easy to see that for this case, the assumption is satisfied whenever all
agents’ relative risk aversion is less than or equal to one. For the case of several commodities the
assumption is difficult to verify if ua,h(.) is non-separable, but it is a well-defined assumption on
fundamentals.
The assumption guarantees that minimal recursive equilibria always exist. To see this, note that
existence of a minimal recursive equilibrium can only fail if given some initial shock, s0 there exist two
distinct competitive equilibria (λ(σ), λ′(σ))σ∈Σ with λa,h(s0) = λ
′
a,h(s0) for all (a, h) ∈ A−1. Putting
it differently, we need to rule out that given an initial ’state’ (s0, (λa,h(s0))(a,h)∈A−1) there can be
two different ’continuation equilibria’. Suppose to the contrary, that there exist two competitive
equilibria (λ(σ), λ′(σ))σ∈Σ with λ
′(s1) 6= λ(s1) for at least one node at t = 1, while λ(s0) = λ
′(s0).
Define λa,h(s
t) = min[λa,h(s
t), λ′a,h(s
t)] for all (a, h) ∈ A and all st. We will show below that the
sequence of Negishi weights (λ(σ))σ∈Σ does not lead to a feasible consumption allocation, which
contradicts the assumption that there exist two equilibria (λ(σ))σ∈Σ 6= (λ
′(σ))σ∈Σ as characterized
above.
Again, define v(st; (λ(σ))) and w(st; (λ(σ))) as the (possibly non-Markovian) values of e- and
f -endowments, where the definition follows the definition of V and W , i.e. for example for a < A,
wa,h(s
t; (λ(σ))) = λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t)))·(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))−ωa,h(st))+
∑
st+1≻st
wa+1,h(s
t+1; (λ(σ)))
We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 For all st and for any (a, h) ∈ A and any y ∈ F , it must be true that
λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))) · y ≤
min
[
λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))) · y, λ′a,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ
′(st))) · y
]
.
Proof. W.l.o.g. take λa,h(s
t) ≤ λ′a,h(s
t), thus λa,h(s
t) = λ′a,h(s
t). Since −Dxua,h(Xa,h(s, .)) · y
satisfies the gross substitute property, we have
λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))) · y ≤ λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))) · y.
Moreover, define λˆ by λˆa′,h′ = λa′,h′(s
t) for (a′, h′) 6= (a, h) and λˆa,h = λ
′
a,h(s
t). By the gross
substitute property we must have
λ′a,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ
′(st))) · y ≥ λˆa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λˆ(s
t)) · y
≥ λa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λ(s
t))) · y,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that λˆa,h(s
t)Dxua,h(Xa,h(st, λˆ(s
t))) is identical
across all agents, (a, h), and similarly for λ. 
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Lemma 3 For all st and all (a, h),
wa,h(s
t; (λ(σ))) ≥ min
[
wa,h(s
t; (λ(σ))), wa,h(s
t; (λ′(σ)))
]
, (9)
with the inequality holding strict for some st and some h.
Proof. Applying Assumption 1 and Lemma 2 to
vA,h(s
t;λ(σ)) = λA,h(s
t)DxuA,h(XA,h(st, λ(s
t))) · (XA,h(st, λ(s
t))− ea,h(st)),
we find that the following is satisfied for a = A:
va,h(s
t;λ(σ)) ≥


va,h(s
t;λ(σ)), if λA,h = λA,h,
va,h(s
t;λ′(σ)), if λA,h = λ
′
A,h,
for all σ and h. (10)
We now show that if (10) holds for a+ 1, then it also does for a. Suppose w.l.o.g. that λa,h(s
t) =
λa,h(s
t). For each st+1 ≻ st there are two cases possible. In the first case, λa+1,h(s
t+1) =
δa+1,h(st+1, st)λa,h(s
t), then λa+1,h(s
t+1) = λa+1,h(s
t), and thus va+1,h(s
t+1;λ(σ)) ≥ va+1,h(s
t+1;λ(σ))
by the induction hypothesis. In the second case, λa+1,h(s
t+1) > δa+1,h(st+1, st)λa,h(s
t), then
va+1,h(s
t+1;λ(σ)) ≥ va+1,h(s
t+1;λ(σ)) = 0. Summing up, we find that (10) holds for a.
Again suppose w.l.o.g. that λa,h(s
t) = λa,h(s
t). By (10) and Lemma 2, we have for all σ and h:
wa,h(s
t;λ(σ)) = va,h(s
t;λ(σ))−
A−a−1∑
i=0
∑
st+ist
λi,h(s
t+i)Dxua+i,h(Xa+i,h(st+i, λ(s
t+i)) · fa+i,h(st+i)
≥ va,h(s
t;λ(σ))−
A−a−1∑
i=0
∑
st+ist
λi,h(s
t+i)Dxua+i,h(Xa+i,h(st+i, λ(s
t+i)) · fa+i,h(st+i)
= wa,h(s
t;λ(σ)).
This finishes the proof. 
The equilibrium conditions require that
w1,h(s0; (λ(σ)) = 0,
∑
(a,h)∈A−1
wa,h(s0, λ(σ))− λa,h(s0)Dxua,h(ca,h(s0)) (q(s0; (λ(σ))) + d(s0)) = 0,
and similarly for λ′. Using Lemmas 2 and 3, this implies that
∑
(a,h)∈A
wa,h(s0, λ(σ))− λa,h(s0)Dxua,h(ca,h(s0)) (q(s0; (λ(σ))) + d(s0)) > 0, (11)
where we use that
q(s0; (λ(σ))) =
∑
t′>0
∑
st
′
≻s0
Dxu1,1(X1,1(s
′
t, λ(s
t′))
Dxu1,1(X1,1(s0, λ(s0)))
λ1,1(s
t′)d(st′).
As (11) is a contradiction to feasibility of (λ(σ))σ∈Σ we have proved that there cannot be two
continuation equilibria and thus there exists a minimal recursive equilibrium.
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4.2.2 Computation
As before we consider a simple time-iteration collocation method. Since there are important dif-
ferences to the unconstrained case, it is useful to describe the algorithm in some detail. The main
steps are as follows.
1. Set n = 0 and start with initial guesses Wˆ 0 : S×R
(A−1)H
+ → R
(A−1)H and Vˆ 0 : S×R
(A−1)H
+ →
R
(A−1)H .
2. Given Vˆ n, for each s ∈ S and each λ˜i ∈ G, compute ηˆn(s, λ˜i) as a solution to the non-linear
complementarity problem
Vˆ n(s, λ˜i + ηˆn(s, λ˜i)) ≥ 0, ηˆn(s, λ˜i)) ≥ 0
Vˆ na,h(s, λ˜
i + ηˆn(s, λ˜i))ηˆna,h(s, λ˜
i)) = 0 for all (a, h) ∈ A−1
Interpolate {ηˆn(s, λ˜i), i = 1, ..., G} to obtain approximating functions ηˆn(s, .).
3. Given ηˆn, Vˆ n and Wˆn, for each s ∈ S and each λ˜i ∈ G, compute ℓˆn+1(s, λ˜i) as the solution to
ℓˆn+1(s, λ˜i)Dxu1,h(X1,h(s, λ
i)) · (X1,h(s, λ
i)− ω1,h) +
∑
s′
δ2,h(s, s
′)Wˆn2,h(s
′, λ˜(s′)) = 0, h ∈ H,
where λi = (ℓˆn+1(s, λ˜i), λ˜i) and λ˜i(s′) =
(
δa,h(s, s
′)λia−1,h + ηˆ
n(s′, δa,h(s, s
′)λia,h)
)
(a,h)∈A−1
.
With these values for λi and λ˜i(s′) compute for all (a, h) ∈ A−1
Wˆn+1a,h (s, λ˜
i) = λa,hDxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ
i)) · (Xa,h(s, λ
i)−ωa,h)+
∑
s′
δa+1,h(s, s
′)Wˆna+1,h(s
′, λ˜i(s′)),
Vˆ n+1a,h (s, λ˜
i) = λa,hDxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ
i)) · (Xa,h(s, λ
i)− ea,h) +
∑
s′
δa+1,h(s, s
′)Vˆ na+1,h(s
′, λ˜i(s′)),
where Wˆn+1A+1,h(s, λ˜
i) := 0, and Vˆ n+1A+1,h(s, λ˜
i) := 0.
4. For each s ∈ S, interpolate {Wˆn+1(s, λ˜i), i = 1, ..., G} to obtain approximating functions
Wˆn+1(s, .) and interpolate {Vˆ n+1(s, λ˜i), i = 1, ..., G} to obtain approximating functions Vˆ n+1(s, .).
5. Check some error criterion. If error criterion not met, increase n by 1 and go to 2.
6. Set Wˆ ∗ = Wˆn+1, Vˆ ∗ = Vˆ n+1 and interpolate ℓˆn(s, λ˜i) to obtain ℓˆ∗(s, .).
While the algorithm appears more complicated than for the case of complete markets, it is
actually only Step 2 that is different and that is computationally expensive. For many realistic
calibrations one can expect the borrowing constraint to bind rarely for older agents which can
simplify the computations in Step 2 considerably.
Under the gross substitute assumption from above, we can prove that the algorithm converges
under the idealized scenario where the function approximation is exact. To formalize this, let
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W 0a,h(λ, s) = λa,hDxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ)) · (Xa,h(s, λ) − ωa,h) and V
0
a,h(λ, s) = λa,hDxua,h(Xa,h(s, λ)) ·
(Xa,h(s, λ)− ea,h) and define η
n(s, λ) as well as V n(s, λ) and Wn(s, λ) to solve Steps 2 and 3 of the
algorithm exactly (i.e. for all λ). We prove the following theorem in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, for each n = 1, ... the functions V n and Wn are well defined and as
n→∞, V n → V ∗ and Wn →W ∗ for some function V ∗,W ∗ that describe a recursive equilibrium.
5 Interpretation
The planner’s maximization problem (1) obviously only has a solution if Pareto-weights are summable.
While this is guaranteed in the presence of a Lucas tree, Pareto-efficiency of equilibrium allocations
itself is not enough to ensure this. However, in the absence of a tree as long as markets are complete,
one can always, even if the equilibrium allocation is dynamically inefficient work with the concept of
Malinvaud efficiency (see e.g. Aliprantis et al. (1990)). An allocation is Malinvaud efficient if there
exist no Pareto-dominating allocation that differs at only finitely many nodes. For these allocations
one can construct Negishi-weights through a limit argument. The analysis in Section 2 goes through
without any changes.
More interestingly, in models with incomplete markets and in models with borrowing constraints
(see Gottardi and Kubler (2012)) competitive equilibria are typically constrained suboptimal – there
is no social planner’s problem that determines the equilibrium allocation. Nevertheless, we show
in this paper that it can be useful to employ (instantaneous) Negishi weights as a state variable.
The question then arises what these weights ’represent’ and how errors in the computations can
be interpreted economically (recall that for the case of complete markets and efficient equilibria a
straightforward interpretation was possible). Although sequential equilibria are not (constrained)
Pareto-efficient for the model where agents live for A periods, they are efficient if we reformulate the
model and assume that agents only live for one period while dynasties live for A periods. Within a
dynasty, an agent derives utility from his consumption and the consumption of his successors in the
dynasty. But of course, Pareto-optimality means that it is impossible to improve all agents, not all
dynasties. More formally, an agent is now identified by the date-event of the birth of his dynasty,
st, by the age of his dynasty, a and by the type, h. He derives utility from his own consumption
and the consumption of successors within the dynasty:
Ua,h,st(x) = δa,h(s
t)ua,h(x(s
t)) +
A∑
i=a+1
δi,h(s
t+i)ui,h(x(s
t+i)).
We say that an allocation (xa,h(s
t)) is D-Pareto-efficient if there is no allocation where all agents
(a, h, st) are weakly better off and some strictly.
Given a summable sequence of instantaneous Negishi-weights (λ(σ))σ∈Σ the allocation (x(σ))
with xa,h(s
t) = Xa,h(st, λ(s
t)) for all (a, h) and all st must be the solution to the maximization
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problem
max
x
∑
(a,h)∈A,st
λa,h(s
t)ua,h(xa,h(s
t)) s.t.
∑
(a,h)∈A
xa,h(s
t) = ω¯(st) for all s
t,
which can be rewritten as
max
x
∑
(a,h)∈A,st
ηa,h(s
t)Ua,h,st(x) s.t.
∑
(a,h)∈A
xa,h(s
t) = ω¯(st) for all s
t,
where
η1,h(s
t) = λ1,h(s
t), ηa,h = λa,h(s
t)− δa,h(st−1, st)λa−1,h(s
t−1), a = 2, . . . , A.
An allocation is D-Pareto-efficient if for summable (λa,h(s
t)) the resulting weights satisfy ηa,h(s
t) ≥ 0
for all (a, h) ∈ A and all st. Since we can normalize instantaneous Negishi weights node by node,
the requirement that (λa,h(σ)) are summable in itself is vacuous – given a sequence that is not
summable, we can define a new sequence that characterizes the same allocation and is summable.
However, the crucial requirement is that the resulting ηa,h(σ) are non-negative, i.e. that λa,h(s
t) ≥
δa,h(st, st−1)λa−1,h(s
t−1) for all (a, h) ∈ A−1 and all s
t. This alone imposes no restrictions, as any
allocation characterized by a sequence of Negishi-weights is D-Malinvaud efficient, in the sense that
there is no other allocation that D-Pareto-dominates it and differs only at finitely many nodes.
When there is a complete set of Arrow-securities our construction of λ in the definition of
recursive equilibrium ensures that the welfare weights for the dynasty model, (ηa,h(s
t)), are always
positive. Moreover, the weights must be summable because the price of the tree is finite and we
have
λ1,1(s
t)∂1,1(s
t)q(st) ≥
∑
σ≻st
λ1,1(σ)∂1,1(σ)d(σ).
When markets are incomplete the allocation might fail to be D-Pareto optimal and welfare weights
need to be interpreted as limits as in the Malinvaud case. Different assumptions on financial markets
and borrowing constraints then simply translate into different restrictions on bequest. To see that
it is useful to define an agent’s optimization problem recursively. Given prices (q(σ), p(σ), π(σ)),
define UA+1,h(s
t, κ) = 0, and for a = 1, ..., A, define
Ua,h(s
t, κ) = max
x∈RL+,θ≥0,φ
ua,h(x) +
∑
st+1st
δa+1,h(st, st+1)Ua+1,h(s
t+1, κ(st+1)) subject to
κ+ π(st) · ωa,h(st) = π(s
t) · x+ q(st)θ + p(st) · φ
κ(st+1) = θ(q(st+1) + π(st) · d(st+1)) + φ · b(st+1) for all s
t+1  st
κ(st+1) ∈ Ka+1,h(s
t+1),
where K(st) is some set that can depend on current and future prices as well as on agents’ en-
dowments. A competitive equilibrium for the dynasty economy consists of asset prices and agents’
choices, i.e. consumption choices and bequest-portfolios so that markets clear and all agents maxi-
mize their utility. It is easy to see that depending on the market structure and on the specification
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of the sets K(st) we can construct economies for which equilibrium allocations and prices will be
identical to the ones in the various OLG economies considered in this paper.
As in the case discussed in Section 2, approximation errors in computations can now be in-
terpreted as transfers necessary to obtain the computed D-efficient allocation as an equilibrium
allocation.
6 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the theorem we require two lemmas. Yet first of all, we introduce the following notation:
For α, x, y ∈ RAH we write x = (xa,h)(a,h)∈A and define
z = x⊕α y ⇔ for all h = 1, . . . , H : z1,h = y1,h and za,h = αa,hxa−1,h + ya,h, a = 2, ..., A.
Lemma 4 Suppose F : RAH+ → R
AH satisfies the strict gross substitute property and is homogeneous
of degree zero. Given any x, α ∈ RAH++ suppose there exist η, η
′ ∈ RAH+ \R
AH
++ with ηa,h > 0, η
′
a,h > 0 for
some (a, h) ∈ A. If F (x⊕α η) ≥ 0, F (x⊕α η
′) ≥ 0 and ηa,hFa,h(x⊕α η) = 0, η
′
a,hFa,h(x⊕α η
′) = 0,
for all (a, h) ∈ A, then η = η′.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that η, η′ /∈ RAH++ and η 6= η
′. Then there is an (a, h) and a ξ > 0
such that ηa,h > 0, (x⊕α η)a,h = ξ(x⊕α η
′)a,h, and ξ(x⊕α η
′) > x⊕α η. The latter inequality holds
strict because η 6= η′ and because both are not strictly positive. But since F (.) is homogeneous of
degree zero we must have that
Fa,h
(
ξ(x⊕α η
′)
)
= Fa,h(x⊕α η
′) ≥ 0.
On the other hand, by the strict gross substitute property and since ηa,h > 0 we must have
Fa,h
(
ξ(x⊕α η
′)
)
< Fa,h(x⊕α η) = 0,
which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 5 Suppose F : RAH+ → R
AH satisfies the strict gross substitute property and is homogeneous
of degree zero. For any α, x, y ∈ RAH++ with y > x suppose there exist η
x, ηy ∈ RAH+ such that
F (x ⊕α η
x) ≥ 0, F (y ⊕α η
y) ≥ 0 and ηxa,hFa,h(x ⊕α η
x) = 0 and ηya,hFa,h(y ⊕α η
y) = 0 for all
(a, h) ∈ A. If xa,h = ya,h for some a, h then it must hold that
Fa,h(x⊕α η
x) ≥ Fa,h(y ⊕α η
y).
Proof. If ηya,h > 0 or if η
y
a,h = 0 and η
x = 0, then the result holds by construction.
If ηya,h = 0 and η
x > 0, then we must have x ⊕α η
x = y ⊕α η
y. If this were not the case,
there must exist an (a, h) with ηxa,h > 0 and a ξ > 0 such that (x ⊕α η
x)a,h = ξ(y ⊕α η
y)a,h and
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ξ(y⊕αη
y) > (x⊕αη
x). As in the previous proof this leads to a contradiction since Fa,h (ξ(y ⊕α η
y)) =
Fa,h(y ⊕α η
y) ≥ 0 while Fa,h (ξ(y ⊕α η
y)) < Fa,h(x⊕α η
x) = 0. 
To prove the theorem first note that under Assumption 1, W 0 and V 0 satisfy the gross substi-
tute property. It is a standard argument to show that equilibrium exists for each finitely truncated
economy and that therefore the complementarity problem that determines η0(s, λ) has a solution.
By Lemma 4 this solution must be unique. Given Wn, V n and ηn with V n,Wn satisfying the gross
substitute property, by existence there must exist ℓn+1(s, λ). Wn+1 and V n+1 are well defined and
Lemma 5 implies that they satisfy the gross substitute property. Normalizing λ to lie in a compact
set, it is easy to see that ℓn(s, λ) is uniformly bounded across n. Therefore there must exist some
finite liminf and some finite limsup as n→∞. It is easy to see that both must describe a compet-
itive equilibrium. Our argument in Section 4.2.1 implies that under Assumption 1 there must be
a unique equilibrium and hence the liminf must equal to the limsup. With ℓn converging one can
then verify that also Wn and V n must converge.
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